that Israel and LaFave were led to create such a thoughtful nutshell not only because of their own scholarly bent, but also because there was no general treatise or hornbook on criminal procedure. 4 They have since filled that void themselves, expanding their nutshell into a multi-volume treatise for practitioners 5 and a one-volume hornbook for students. 6 Federal Indian law 7 is in somewhat the same position today as criminal procedure was a decade ago. There is a thorough one-volume treatise published in 1982, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 8 but it is becoming outdated and, in any event, seems focused more on the problems of the practitioner than those of the law professor or student. 9 Unlike criminal procedure, however, there has been relatively little scholarly writing of a general nature about federal Indian law. Yet, even in such a sparse field, the publication of a nutshell is unlikely to have any significant scholarly impact. The formidable requirements of the nutshell format -severe length limitations coupled with the primary goal of analyzing the law simply and clearly for student consumption -make that impossible. But an excellent nutshell can assist, perhaps even encourage, the scholarly mission by stimulating an analytical approach to law school teaching and learning. The nature of federal Indian law, coupled with the absence of any convenient onevolume scholarly treatment, makes this kind of opportunity peculiarly available even for the lowly nutshell.
Judge William Canby first exploited this opening in 1981, when the first edition of his nutshell on federal Indian law was published. 10 A second edition recently appeared. 11 For those of us who teach in this area, the publication of the second edition is a welcome event that, 4 . Indeed, Jaw review writing sometimes treated Israel and Lafave's nutshell much like a treatise, which indicated both the quality of the book and the Jack of alternatives. See, e.g., Note 
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1984).
6. w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1985) . The nutshell remains, however, in updated form. See J. ISRAEL & w. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL (4th ed. 1988).
7. By "federal Indian law," I mean simply federal law concerning Native Americans. Since this is the conventional name for the field, I will use it even though it perpetuates a misnomer relating to Christopher Columbus' geographical confusion. notwithstanding the limitations of the nutshell format, should contribute to our scholarship as well as to our students' learning. 12 To understand why requires a look at both the peculiar nature of federal Indian law and the other general scholarship in this area. This examination, in turn, leads to some insights about an agenda for future scholarship, including the need for a scholarly hornbook. In the last analysis, evaluating the nutshell in a broad context illuminates much about the strengths and weaknesses of this area of law.
I
Over one hundred years ago, a Harvard Law Review article proclaimed that " [t] he American student could select few single subjects the survey of which would bring under view a greater variety of important general principles, or afford more scope for forensic reasoning in the application of such principles, than the law relating to Indians." 13 Today, the few students who survey federal Indian law -in academic year 1987-1988, only thirty-four American law professors indicated that they offered such a course or seminar 14 -would probably be amused by this century-old assertion. The important genera\ principles in this field seem conflicting and confounding, regardless of the student's forensic reasoning skills. 15 Although seemingly amenable to black letter rule "codification" on the surface, federal Indian law, upon careful examination, may often appear closer to the novelist Mark Harris' card game TEGWAR -"The Exciting Game Without Any Rules" 16 -except that the federal government always gets to deal.
In my experience, students and novice professors alike initially find that learning, teaching, and writing about federal Indian law are foreign experiences. There are probably myriad reasons why this is so, but I wish to dwell upon five. Each demonstrates that federal Indian law desperately needs a single source -and a good nutshell helps, for starters -that is current, broad in scope, and analytical and detached in outlook.
First, federal Indian law is highly complicated and often inconsistent. To take just one complicated example, consider the authority of the federal government, the states, and the tribes to exercise sovereignty over Indian country. State authority to regulate in Indian 12. For enthusiasm of a somewhat different sort about the first edition of Canby's nutshell, see Clinton, Book Review, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 377 (1983).
13. Abbott, Indians and the Law, 2 HARV. L. REv. 167, 167 (1888).
14. AssOCIATION OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 993 (1987) (1988) . In addition, some law schools offer the course through a part-time or adjunct instructor, and some colleges and junior colleges provide some variety of instruction on this subject. 18 or by federal common law designed to protect the right of reservation Indians to self-government. 19 Even so, the states may be allowed to regulate if the conduct sought to be regulated would have effects outside Indian country. 20 The standards for each of the three preemptive strands, and for the state's buffering authority surrounding Indian country, are far from clear. 21 However, the tribe's correlative inherent authority to regulate its own members in Indian country is well established,2 2 and that authority, because it is inherent in the tribe's sovereignty and predates European "discovery" of this continent, is unbounded by specific provisions of the federal Constitution. 23 Yet these matters, too, can be modified by federal law. 24 In contrast to these somewhat clear approaches to the tribe's authority over its members, tribal power to regulate the activities of nonmembers in Indian country seems to turn ·on an elusive balancing of the intrusiveness of the regulation upon the autonomy of the nonmember, the extent to which the tribe has historically exercised such authority, the importance of the regulation to tribal self-government, and perhaps even whether the nonmember is a Native American. 25 Here, too, the principles are opaque and difficult to aggregate. For instance, it takes some extreme mental gymnastics to explain why a tribe should have expansive authority to tax a nonmember corporation doing busi- Second, federal Indian law is influenced heavily by particularly elusive historical and societal factors. Federal Indian policy has oscillated from forced assimilation to limited respect for tribal self-govemment. 29 Self-appointed supporters of better treatment for Native Americans have sometimes persuaded the federal government to adopt well-intentioned approaches that ultimately redounded to the extreme detriment of the supposed beneficiaries. 30 Two centuries of deprivations, coupled with the current poor socioeconomic status of Native Americans, may feed a white guilt that seemingly leads just as easily to forced assimilation ("make them like us, and their lot in life will improve to our level") as to tribal self-determination. Most important for law professors and students may be the recognition that federal Indian law has historically gJ;eatly abetted the invasions of the Indians' sovereignty and land rights. 31 In 1823, in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 32 the Supreme Court concluded that, in light of European "discovery" and supposed domination, tribes held their traditional lands essentially at the federal government's sufferance and could not convey their interests without federal approval. Ghief Justice Mars,hall stated: · We will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturalists, merchants, and manufacturers, have a right, on a\'>stract principles, to expeJ hunters from the territory they possess, or to contx;act their limits. Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, 29. For a brief but thoughtful historical overview, see W. CANBY, supra note 11, at 9-31.
30. The most vivid instance is the General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), which was promoted by well meaning white reformers (as well as others with less noble goals) but resulted in massive destruction of the tribal land base and impractical ownership patterns of land that has remained in Indian hands. For a cpncise discussion of the Allotment Act, see pp. 19-22. [Vol. 87:1199 whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted. 33 The "actual state of things" 34 that Marshall stressed in a later opinion, and in which subsequent Justices have acquiesced, is unlike almost anything else a law student encounters and a law professor ponders. Simply put, the deprivations suffered by Native Americans have roots unique from those suffered by other disadvantaged minorities in American society. 35 Similarly, Indian tribes have unique rights as well, including the right to limited internal sovereignty, 36 treaty rights, 37 and limited rights rising from their "trust" relationship with the federal government. 38 This, too, distinguishes them from other American mi:q.orities, which have been largely unsuccessful in pursuing group rights. 39 Third, federal Indian law, although heavily rooted in history, is However this restriction may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which the country has been settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by Courts of justice. 34. In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543 (1832), Marshall said: [P]ower, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom they descend. We proceed, then, to the actual state of things, having glanced at their origin; because holding it in our recollection might shed some light on existing pretensions.
35. By this I do not mean to ignore the raw violence in which the American history of slavery is rooted. It is important to recognize, however, that the taking of the Native American's land -and the supposed justifications supporting it -do not have parallels in the experience of other disadvantaged American minorities. The comment in the text is not intended to assess the comparative immorality of the dominant American society's treatment of particular minorities.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24. 37. Absent either consensual modification or unilateral Congressional abrogation of an Indian treaty, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 69-70, the provisions of the treaty remain intact despite any tensions between their terms and modem conditions. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assoc., 443 U.S. 658 (1979) . Charles Wilkinson has rightly contended that this "insulation against time" is an important right that is preservative of Indian sovereignty. See c. WILKINSON constantly evolving. The Supreme Court decides several federal Indian law cases a year, constituting a percentage of the Court's workload that exceeds its attention to seemingly less peripheral subjects such as securities regulation and bankruptcy. 40 In part, at least, this is because of the disproportionate significance ofindian claims in today's world. For example, voidable conveyances from tribes two centuries ago continue to cloud land titles in the eastern United States. 41 The scarce water resources of the western United States, so essential for agricultural development, are subject to supervening Indian claims. 42 And more aggressive assertions of sovereignty by tribal governments have led to serious confrontations about the scope and limits of federal, state, and tribal power. 43 At a minimum, federal Indian law needs a reliable source that incorporates this evolution. Better yet would be a single source that analyzes that law in its context in modern society.
Fourth, many of the most interesting aspects of federal Indian law, for better or worse, are the handiwork of judges -for example, original Indian title, 44 the status of tribes as "domestic dependent nations,"4S the "plenary power" of Congress over tribes, 46 the supposed trust relationship between the federal government and the tribes, 47 the congeries of approaches taken to state and tribal authority to regulate in Indian country, 48 the canons for construing federal treaties and statutes involving Indians, 49 even the standards for assessing the geographic limits of Indian country itself. so Just how well the Supreme Court has performed its expansive role in federal Indian law is the subject of sharp controversy.s 1 To understand this area of law, one [Vol. 87:1199 must adopt a decisionmaking pose and search for the factors underlying the Court's resolution of particular controversies.s 2 This is no small task, both because the basic concepts -for example, tribal sovereignty -are decidedly foreign to most persons, and because the Court's opinions often fail to stress facts that, as a practical matter, probably strongly influenced the outcome of the case. Illustratively, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, s 3 in which the Court held that tribal courts have no crimiitaljurisdiction over non-Indians,s 4 takes on new light when it is noted that the reservation in question contained almost 3000 non-Indian residents and only fifty tribal members. One can discover this only by reading a footnote in the opinion, which makes the point in a matter-of-fact manner.ss Today, as in the days of Chief Justice Marshall, the judicial perception of "the actual state of things" remains crucial.
Finally (relying in part upon subs,equent demographic developments in deciding whether an area re· mained Indian country, but admitting that this was "an unotthodox and potentially unreliable method"). and Rice deal with tribal authority to regulate hunting and fishing66 and liquor transactions, 67 respectively. A reader who consults specialized discussions in federal Indian law sources can easily lose sight of the forest for the trees. Only a general source with a vision that sweeps across federal Indian law can attempt to avoid the tendency of the field to unravel into a congeries of technical specialties of seemingly little relationship.
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 68 the one-volume treatise published in 1982 by a consortium of scholars, cannot fully carry the freight of all these needs. The Handbook synthesized the state of the law in 1982, and along the way it made some concrete suggestions for legal evolution. On the whole, however, it did not subject federal Indian law to probing, fundamental analysis. In short, the Handbook largely performs the role of a good practitioner's treatise: it explains, indeed helps construct, the current state of the law and identifies some lines of argument that arise out of the law "as is." That is valuable to the law professor and student, but the Handbook falls short of satisfying their need for a comprehensive source. This is because the professor and student should be concerned not so much about the intricacies of the current state of the law, but rather about how that law developed, what normative and empirical assumptions underlie its principles, where that law is likely to go, and how one might craft arguments to take it on another course. The Handbook, though a valuable and worthwhile enterprise, is aimed largely in a different direction.
In this scholarly vacuum, Judge Canby has succeeded in employing the nutshell format to good effect. Indeed, this second edition may reach the limits of scholarship possible in that format. Of course, because of the page limitations and simplifying exposition required for a study aid, he cannot engage in wide-ranging analysis of every problem. Nonetheless, he frequently deals with the major developments in federal Indian law, not as dry legal rules, but as intellectual problems. In particular, his second edition often uses a probing approach that seeks to open the student's mind to the essential controversies lurking beneath the black letter rules. Perhaps Canby's eight years as a federal appellate judge, coupled with the fourteen years 'he spent as a law professor teaching . and writing about fed~ral Indian law, make him uniquely qualified to introduce students to the subject. In essence, he gives the students some perspective. In the snarl offederal Indian law, that contribution should not be underestimated.
A good example is his discuss'ion of the judicial. treatment of In- This discussion illuminates for the student -and professor -that normative judgments continue to rest at the heart of modem federal Indian law; that Indian law continues to be largely judicially constructed; and that its critics miss the mark if they aim only at Congress, the state legislatures, or the tribes themselves. In particular, Canby rightly stresses that the canons of construction announced by the Supreme Court to guide interpretation of federal treaties and statutes dealing with Indians (pp. 88-91) are based on normative factors. These canons, phrased sympathetically to protect Indian interests, arise not only from the judicially created trust responsibility, but also "[t]o compensate for the disadvantage at which the treaty-making process placed the tribes" (p. 88). He also forthrightly recognizes that the Court invokes the sympathetic canons selectively, and he makes no attempt to gloss over the fact that the Court occasionally even ignores them (pp. 90-91).
A second good example of the useful perspective Canby provides is his treatment of Oliphant 11 and its aftermath (pp. 69-70). Oliphant held that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because that power would be inconsistent with their status as "domestic dependent nations," even though no federal treaty or statute divested the tribe in question of this authority. tribes' sovereignty was truncated by their dependent relationship to the federal government, had articulated only two limitations inherently arising from this status: Tribes could not convey land without federal government approval, and tribes could not enter into treaties with foreign powers. 73 Canby also explains that Marshall's analysis was based upon European notions of international law "which the Indian tribes might have thought quite irrelevant, but in Marshall's view that was the only kind of law that the Supreme Court could apply" (p. 67). Canby stresses that some 150 years passed before the Court in Oliphant recognized a third inherent limitation on tribal sovereignty arising from dependent status (p. 69). "While the two limitations originally delineated by Chief Justice Marshall ... were almost inevitable concomitants of dependent status, that of Oliphant was considerably less so" (p. 69). "By opening the door to additional judicial limitations upon tribal sovereignty," Canby continues, "Oliphant poses a significant potential threat to tribal autonomy" (p. 70). He concludes by noting several decisions following Oliphant that have made further judicial inroads upon tribal sovereignty based upon dependent status and stresses that the Court has yet to articulate a clear standard for these cases (p. 70). In later sections focusing on criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, Canby returns to Oliphant, more directly criticizes the opinion, and explains the practical difficulties arising from the decision for the enforcement of criminal law in general, and hunting and fishing regulation in particular (pp. 137-39, 315).
Canby's perspective and candor on these two topics, so useful to the law student and professor alike, can be profitably contrasted with the approach taken to them in the Handbook of Federal Indian Law. The Handbook makes the sympathetic canons of construction one of the cornerstones of federal Indian law. 74 This may well exaggerate them beyond their practical significance. In some cases the sympathetic canons are trumped by other canons --for example, that waivers of sovereign immunity must be clearly stated, 75 or that there is a strong presumption against federal conveyance of a riverbed 76 -and in other cases they are just ignored. 77 More generally, canons of construction are of limited utility in controlling judicial discretion in public law, 78 You must see through and around your subject, measuring it by more than one measuring stick, turning it over, testing it, arriving at a just and clear-headed assessment of its position in the hierarchy of things.
The word that best expresses this requisite distance is "detachment," Utiderstood as a certain amusement with the enterprise upon which you are engaged, a sense of humor about yourself and your works. If a lawyer has it, the lawyer's writing will unfailingly communicate the play of intelligence ("play" here being as important as "intelligence"). sz
There are, of course, law review articles on federal Indian law with this scholarly perspective, as well as some thoughtful books and booklength monographs worth particular attention.s 3 None of these sources, however, provides an analytical survey across the breadth of the field that is both accessible to the novice and still thought-provoking to the expert. The best source the field has to offer on this score is Canby's pedagogical aid, which may indirectly encourage some scholarship through its useful application of perspective to the knotty problems in the area. · A nutshell cannot remake such a field, and Canby makes no claim to do so. He does not include any discussion of the exciting debates that are beginning to emerge in federal Indian law scholarshi.p. 84 Nor does the nutshell consider the alternative visio:qs recently proposed by critics, which range from a fundamental recasting ·of Indian law 85 (in part based on notions of sovereignty under international law 8 6), to a less radical and more traditiona.1, "lawyerly" use of analogies to general · constitutional precedents to propose new constitutional rights for tribes and individual Native Americans. 87 Such developments are perhaps too far afield for a nutshell. Yet, a concluding chapter briefly surveying "contempor~ theoretical controversies" would have been very useful for students and professors alike. So, too, a short survey of contemporary practical problems would have been helpful. Another timely addition, in this era of the bicentennial of the Constitution, would have been a discussion of the place of tribes in the constitutional system.
What federal Indian law needs today is what criminal procedure needed a decade ago: An outstanding, probing hornbook, written largely for law students and professors, but which would also provide substantial benefits to judges, practitioners, and legislators. Such a volume would have one primary goal: to assess the breadth of federal Indian law from a detached, scholarly perspective, critically assessing not only where we are, but how we got here, as well as the multiple paths that could lie ahead. What is needed is decidedly not a treatise rationalizing the law of insular colonial administration, 88 but rather a work that is critical and searching,· asking fundamental questions rather than imposing artificial coherence upon a chaotic field. In short, we need a general work of scholarly curiosity.
Unfortunately, the prospects for such a hornbook are dismal. There are not many others actively writing in this field, and few of them may be interested in undertaking such a daunting project in an area seemingly far removed from the mainstream of public law scholarship. In addition, the field has not yet generated many Native American legal scholars. Thus, it would be difficult for a team of hornbook authors to avoid the "imperial scholar" problem, identified by Richard Delgado, 89 in which non-minority voices perpetually drown out unique minority perspectives. Indeed, Delgado's fears seem particularly applicable to federal Indian law. As Rennard Strickland, one of the few Native American legal scholars, has said, those "who would make effective law and policy for Indian people must first understand Indian people." 9° Finally, another overall disincentive is the relatively low regard for hornbooks held by some elite law faculties.
In any event, the economics of publishing may well rule out a hornbook even if a good scholarly team could be assembled. The market for such a hornbook is probably tiny: few students take the course in law school, and relatively few attorneys practice in the area. Indeed, it has been reported that it took a subsidy of $271,000 -a substantial portion of which was federal money -to produce the Handbook 91 Perhaps the saddest consequence of this probable state of scholarly affairs is practical rather than academic. In the long run, public law scholarship and the practice of public law are inexorably linked. A first-rate hornbook, both by its own analytical force and by its derivative effect upon a generation of scholars, teachers, and students cum practitioners, might help federal Indian law evolve into a more analytically satisfying regime. At present, this law is in need of a transfusion of critical insight. This area of law has developed extraordinarily haphazardly. Congress has periodically :fluctuated in its policy concerning Indian tribes 92 and adopted important statutes without much deliberation. 93 The Supreme Court has often drifted along with the congres- 94. The Court has attributed to Congress a "plenary power" over Indian affairs and has never struck down as unconstitutional a federal statute regulating tribes. See generally Newton, supra note 46. For example, the Court decided United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), during the period in which federal policy was to break up tribal landholding and encourage individual Indians to hold property and adopt white ways. The issue in that case was whether a federal law making it a crime to introduce liquor into Indian country applied to the New Mexico Pueblos. The answer turned on whether their lands were "Indian country" subject to the authority of Congress. Unlike most Indian tribal lands, which American courts have conceptualized as held by the United States in trust for the tribes, the New Mexico Pueblos owned their lands communally in fee simple under grants from the Spanish government that were later confirmed by Congress. Despite this lack of any federal-tribal relationship based on land title, the Court held that the lands in question were subject to congressional authority because the Indians in question were a dependent Indian community. The Court stated in part:
The people of the pueblos, although sedentary rather than nomadic in their inclinations, and disposed to peace and industry, are nevertheless Indians in race, customs, and domestic government. Always living in separate and isolated communities, adhering to primitive modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and feti[s]hism, and chiefly governed according to the crude customs inherited from their ancestors, they are essentially a simple, uninformed and inferior people. . . 95. This observation, consistent with that of others who teach federal Indian law courses, is difficult to document, both because of the nuances associated with judging what constitutes the "overruling" of precedent, and the enormity of examining all of the Court's federal Indian law cases (for one thing, what is "federal Indian law" is debatable at the margin). In any event, no federal Indian law decision leaps out upon a perusal of the lists of overruling decisions provided in Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Constitution of the United States 1789- 97 (1973) The Court's rudderless course is understandable. As Russel Barsh has noted:
[J]udges and lawyers share an education that excludes mature consideration of tribal government. Few law textbooks in general use accord Indian law serious treatment. Ignorance is a powerful helpmate of confusion. In an appeal in which the advocates and judges have only briefly investigated an unfamiliar topic, we can expect what is in fact in evidence in the Supreme Court record: abused precedents, citations to inconsistent chains of precedent, essential cases and statutes overlooked, significant social and economic facts disregarded. 9 1 My own experience8 lend force td Barsh's assertions. Neither I nor, so far as I know, any other of the Supreme Court clerks during the 1979 Term had taken a course in federal Indian law. 98 Nonetheless, we were called upon to help with several major decisions. 99 Upon reconsideration, those decisions of the 1979 Term, like so many others in this field, embody only an illusion of coherence -and a frail one at that, since my students have little difficulty seeing through it. Yet, because I do not question the good faith of the Justices, the illusion may well amount to an unintentional -and therefore all the more pernicious -self-delusion. A first-rate hombook, and the scholarship it could provoke, might expose this illusion and illuminate the essence of the controversies in this area.
For the present, we have a growing wave of thoughtful law review writing, an excellent nutshell, and a useful treatise. Although these are more tools than have ever before been available, they alone surely cannot remake the field. But Native Americans, and their tribes, are not going away, and neither will the controversies of federal Indian law. It remains to be seen whether legal academia responds to the challenge. The highest ideals of the academy support making the effort, of course, but the practicalities of the scholarly and economic marketplaces are extraordinary impediments. Until federal Indian law is seen as an important area of public law rather than an esoteric backwater, few new scholars will have the practical incentive to enter the field. And any enhanced scholarly status for federal Indian law is unlikely to develop without a recognition that insights in this area may cast light on some fundamental general problems of American public law: to name just two, the treatment of minorities and the exercise of judicial decisionmaking unconstrained by constitutional or statutory text. That recognition, in turn, will not occur without scholarship illuminating the linkage between federal Indian law and such enduring public law dilemmas. 100 While the academy stagnates in this chickenand-egg stalemate, the marginality of this field of law -and of those Americans subjected to it -endures.
